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A commentary on
Acute stress affects risk taking but not
ambiguity aversion
by Buckert, M., Schwieren, C., Kudielka, B.,
and Fiebach, C. J. (2014). Front. Neurosci.
8:82. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2014.00082
Observing behavior under extreme con-
ditions (i) provides insights into deci-
sion making processes; and (ii) improves
the external validity of predictions for
behavior outside the lab, if the extreme
condition is similar to a typical decision
situation “in the field.” In terms of the first
contribution, the study by Buckert et al.
(2014) identifies a link between stress, cor-
tisol levels, and risk attitude, supporting
the view that hormone levels are an impor-
tant moderator of risk taking and thus
questioning the concept of stable risk pref-
erences. However, no effect is found for
ambiguity attitudes, suggesting that risk
and ambiguity attitudes derive from differ-
ent physiological and psychological pro-
cesses (cf. Huettel et al., 2006; Levy et al.,
2010). Regarding the second contribution,
risky decision making under stress is typ-
ical for many professions, including such
diverse occupations as medical doctors,
police officers, or traders in financial mar-
kets. Policy and regulation thus need to
take account of insights regarding the link
between stress and risk taking to appropri-
ately predict and regulate behavior in these
professions.
While these insights are of broad inter-
est, they should be taken with care. The
interpretation of both contributions is
potentially affected by selection problems
that did not receive much attention in
the study by Buckert et al. Regarding the
physiological foundations of risk taking,
Buckert et al. find that stress induction
increases risk seeking, but only for those
for whom the stress induction affected cor-
tisol levels. Averaging over all participants,
no effect was found. Indeed, it is clear
that various potential mechanisms can
exists that lead to a correlation of risk atti-
tude and susceptibility to stress symptoms.
Individuals’ demographics, personality
traits, and self-regulatory strategies have
been shown to mediate responses to stress
(Hagger, 2009); these same factors have
also been associated with individual dif-
ferences in risk attitudes (e.g., Borghans
et al., 2008, on personality and demo-
graphics; Bryant and Dunford, 2008, on
regulatory focus). Buckert et al. acknowl-
edge that unobserved factors might be at
play here, rendering the current evidence
correlational (p. 9, section “Limitations”).
But then we need to ask just how
useful randomized treatment-control
experiments with extreme conditions
are, if they deliver only correlational
data.
These problems are not restricted to
the current setting with a psychological
stress priming inventory. In experiments
where participants make decisions under
time pressure (which is one source of
stress that is mentioned by Buckert et al.),
a failure to make a decision within the
time constraint similarly leads to a self-
selected loss of observations. It is there-
fore important to tests whether those
respondents who sometimes violate the
time constraint differ systematically from
those who do not violate time constraints
(Kocher et al., 2013): this requires careful
robustness checks using relevant, i.e., with
respect to the preference under considera-
tion, individual-level background data. It
is an important open question whether
decision makers who are susceptible to
stress in situations as used in Buckert
et al. and related studies are indeed sim-
ilar to those who are not susceptible,
in terms of economic preferences (e.g.,
risk, ambiguity, or time preference). That
is, an explicit study of the heterogene-
ity in stress susceptibility and preferences
would be warranted. Buckert et al. provide
tools that can be used to elucidate these
questions.
With respect to the second contribution
of Buckert et al.’s study, i.e., the predic-
tion of risky choices in situations outside
the lab where decision makers act under
stress, selection is a significant problem
as well. It is clear that people who are
highly susceptible to stress symptoms will
select into different professions than those
who are not affected by stress. But then
heterogeneity in stress susceptibility, and
the correlation of susceptibility with eco-
nomic preferences, becomes essential for
predicting behavior of people who self-
selected in these professions. It has also
been shown that people with low socio-
economic status may experience system-
atically higher stress levels (e.g., Baum
et al., 1999). The link between stress and
attitudes toward uncertainty is therefore
potentially informative on risky behav-
ior across different socio-economic groups
(e.g., Beckert and Lutter, 2013). However,
people are not randomly allocated to their
socio-economic status, and self-selection
that is correlated with economic prefer-
ences is important (Burks et al., 2009).
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That is, in a wide range of applications,
the link between stress and economic pref-
erence will be affected by self-selection.
To make externally valid predictions, we
need to understand the heterogeneity
underlying the link between stress and
preference.
The study by Buckert et al. employs
state-of-the-art preference elicitation and
stress induction methods. Extending these
methods to carefully crafted within-person
designs that elicit both baseline and
treatment data on preferences for each
participant, thus providing the relevant
comparison measures to control for
stress susceptibility, will allow identifying
the crucial heterogeneity in the stress-
preference link. Inventories for mediators
of stress susceptibility that were identified
in the literature can be included to inform
about the processes that prevent stress
effects for the economic preference under
consideration for some respondents, but
not for others. From the perspective of
external validity, as well as with a view on
potential interventions, identification of
malleable mediating factors such as cop-
ing strategies or regulatory focus may be
of special interest here (Higgins, 1997;
Struthers et al., 2000). These results can
then be compared to a complementary
approach where cortisol is directly admin-
istered to participants (cf. Kandasamy
et al., 2014), allowing to investigate in
more detail the pathway from stress,
through cortisol, to economic preferences
and behavior.
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